Sailing Magazine
By Richard Crockett
Over the years there have been many discussions around various “Teak Reefs” as to what happened to ‘Sensation’ in the 1984 Vasco da Gama Race.
The stories mostly were second, third or fourth hand accounts all embellished as they made the rounds, and some not particularly savoury, possibly even libellous, about crew and even the construction of the boat.
I knew her owner, Neil Baily, very well as he was a business partner for some years, plus I sailed with him quite extensively after the ‘Sensation’ incident. I did some Vasco’s with him on his L34, also named ‘Sensation’. So naturally we had several one-on-one discussions as to what happened.
Sadly Neil passed away in early March this year having lived into his eighties.
‘Sensation’s’ navigator was Professor Brian Gowans, well known in Durban sailing circles as a former British Navy officer, an accomplished yachtsman and a man who had navigated for Dave Cox on many occasions prior to this race. He later moved to Cape Town where he also became well known.
Gowans compiled the official report on ‘Sensation’ for the official Club enquiry. I have in my archives the official reports from all competing yachts.
The full compliment aboard ‘Sensation’ for the 1984 Vasco was 11, and as stated in her post race report, written by Gowans, consisted of “many of the most experienced South African yachtsmen with ocean crossings and senior CASA Certificates of Competence”.
During the late afternoon when the south westerly front started to become visible, ‘Sensation’ took the wise decision to move inshore to the 100 fathom line due to the possibility of Rogue Waves. At that stage they were 35nm offshore.
Quoting directly from the report it was stated: “ In the lightning flashes a heavy cloud buiId-up was seen and the crew prepared for another front. This hit at 22h47. SaiIs were lowered except the storm jib. During this period the yacht was swept northwards in winds gusting above 50 knots. Seas were at mast head height breaking over the vessel.
“As the yacht got inshore the seas reduced and the reefed main was hoisted. The yacht beat South. A running fix on North Sands Bluff gave a position 3 ½ miles offshore, 15 miles south of the Casino at midnight. The yacht was taking 3/4 hour legs to seaward at 6 knots (140 C) and 30 minutes inshore (300 C). The coast is dark in this area and instructions were given to shorten the shore leg.
“At 0100 South Sands light was seen and it was thought that the yacht would be about 15 miles North of it.
“At this stage the seas became mountainous with an increase in wind. Waves were breaking over the boat from near masthead height. The skipper plus one was on deck, the remainder below but awake. The engine was running.
“It became apparent that the yacht was being pushed inshore by huge waves. The yacht on one occasion became completely airborne for some seconds. The yacht was thrown around 180 degrees and the deck crew attempted to tack to seaward again.
“We were now into breaking waves and finally struck rocks at 02h53 which punctured the port side hull. The waves were breaking over the boat and the shore could not be seen. The rocks penetrated the cabin demolishing the bunks and fittings.
“No radio signal was made or flares to avoid bringing other yachts into periI.
“The crew took some personal belongings, torches and flares and prepared to abandon ship. One crew member took a long Iine and went onto the rocks and surf until he found a rock to secure an end to. The crew, in a completely orderly fashion with no panic were counted over the side by the skipper and made their way on the rope through the surf to shore about 20 metres away.
“The hull was being pushed inshore on the rocks by the waves until it snagged and impaled.
“The crew huddled together in some rocks until daybreak. The tide had dropped and it was possible to get back aboard to rescue loose gear. A message was passed to a passing passenger ship for relaying to Durban.
“Eventually with the help of holiday makers the crew collected what gear they could, and flew out to the Wild Coast Holiday Inn on a charter aircraft.”
Gowans conclusion, as written in their official report stated the following: “The crew of ‘Sensation’ were prepared for and handled the weather as forecast and it was in my opinion, the correct decision, based on that information, to come inside the 100 fathom line. The crew handled the 60 knot winds and sea condition competently and were still capable of sailing at 6 knots to windward.
“However I believe ‘Sensation’ was hit by a pattern of big (if not freak) waves which threw the boat inshore much more than was realised which could not be detected by navigation or by the crew.
“Eventually it became uncontrollable in the breaking waves (which next morning could be seen to start more than one mile out to sea) and was put ashore on the rocks.
“It is a miracle that the boat landed where it did because almost anywhere else nearby would have resulted in loss of Iife.
“It is a credit to the hull that it did not break up earlier out to sea and particularly when it first struck rock. It stayed intact and did not crush, allowing the crew to get to safety.
“It is however my opinion, based on many years at sea, that above all it was highest level of seamanship and professionalism of the skipper and his crew that resulted in no Iives being lost. l do not see there was anything extra that could have been done which would have averted this tragedy.”
That concludes extracts from Gowans official report.
A First-Hand account by Adam Rice – Sensation Crewman
As stated earlier, there have been many misrepresentations as to exactly what happened, sometimes by crew members too. I have a personal account written for me by Adam Rice, a very good sailing friend I had met ten years prior to this incident, and whom I have known for almost 50 years now. He is a solid citizen whom I trust implicitly, and whom I know not be someone who would overstate, embellish or over-dramatise the situation.
Rice wrote his account for me at the time of the 30th anniversary of the 1984 race. In compiling this report I asked him if he would change it in any way, and whether he was happy I use his name. He changed nothing and was happy I referred to him personally.
Below are some interesting observations he made:
1. We did a refit just before the race and didn’t have time to fit the depth sounder transponder; not necessary as we would be in deep water nearly all the time!
2. We lost sight of Rubicon behind us as it got dark (we were the last to see her) and we were well out to sea and in the current. As the conditions deteriorated we made the decision to get inshore as the waves were so big, steep and broken, and that out of the current would give slightly better seas. As you know along that part of the coast there is very little continental shelf so there was a fine line between being in almost impossible seas or too close to the coast.
3. As we beat south along the coast on port tack with the waves coming more or less abeam they slowly pushed us toward the shore. On starboard tack going back offshore the seas were more or less bow on so we made slow progress back out to sea. The seas were all white water and the B&G wind indicator was stuck on the stop at 60 knots for so long we thought it had broken.
4. We took one (or two?) hour watches with 3 only on deck, helmsman and 2 look-outs.
5. On my watches we had mostly only storm jib, and when we felt we could put up the triple reefed main without being flattened, we did, as we knew we made no progress to windward under storm jib alone.
6. In the dark with more or less zero visibility and a completely dark coast we mis-calculated how little way out to sea we made on starboard and how much we were being pushed in on port by the seas. With only dead reckoning, RDF beacons and no chance of spotting lighthouses we eventually struck the shore.
7. At the time of impact, by chance, Neil Bailey was on the helm and Barry Smith was one of the lookouts, and I think Les Willis was the other. We were on port tack. It was not even possible to tell where the breakers were as everything was white driven spume. I was below and heard the clang as the keel struck.
8. It was by chance high tide when we went aground and the pictures taken the next morning were at low tide making it look as though we could walk ashore.
9. I am sure I speak for everyone on board that we all took collective responsibility, and it is entirely wrong to fix on any single event leading up to the wreck.
