Sailing Magazine
pic by Richard Crockett
Some of the Many Questions Asked Post-race – Answered Here
Should the Race Have Started?
The question has been asked ad infinitum and the answer is definitely yes.
Yacht Inspections
Every single craft that put to sea was thoroughly inspected prior to the race, not once, but in some cases, four or five times. In Durban, every yacht is inspected before it is launched. Before the yacht is granted permission to proceed to sea, the Durban Offshore Yachting Committee inspects the craft and checks that it has all the necessary safety equipment and is of course seaworthy. Prior to every major race, the yachts and their safety equipment are again inspected by the race organisers. Also, every time a yacht changes ownership, its licence to proceed to sea off Durban is cancelled, and it has to be re-inspected and a new clearance certificate issued. To say that the yachts were not prepared for the race is libellous indeed.
Skipper Competence
Every skipper of every yacht had a Durban Pilot’s Exemption certificate, and many of the skippers had an even higher grade CASA Certificate of Competence. (ED. Please note that in those days the CASA Certificate of Competence was VOLUNTARY – unlike today where it’s mandatory to have a SAMSA endorsed Certificate of Competence).
Weather
The race organisers monitored the weather prior to the race and all the meteorology reports were broadcast by the SABC and Durban Radio in their broadcasts to shipping.
The forecasts were for south-westerly winds of 30 – 35 knots, while in the early evening broadcast they did say that the winds could be as strong as 45 knots.
Every single yacht in the fleet could easily handle 45 knots of wind, as all had endured these wind strengths at some time or another.
Should the Race Have Been Called Off?
It is no easy thing to call off an ocean race once it has started, particularly as the fleet was spread over a huge chunk of the sea.
A special message could possibly have been broadcast over the radio with the weather reports, and a large portion of the fleet may have heard it. But, calling off the race at that stage would have made little, if any difference to the outcome, as the storm was already upon the fleet.
What Then Went Wrong?
From the outset it is important to stress that despite the loss of three yachts at sea (assuming that ‘Rubicon’ is not found) and the beaching of ‘Sensation’, the standard of seamanship shown was of the highest order indeed.
Every other yacht made it back to port under its own steam and without outside assistance. This included the six yachts that were dismasted, and also included ‘Transformer’ that was dismasted and without a rudder. ‘Transformer’ was offered a tow by the NSRI and refused it, preferring to make her own way back to harbour. This standard of seamanship I am sure would be difficult to find in other parts of the world.
Nearly all the decisions to turn round and head for home, or to lie a-hull, were taken because it was the safest thing to do, and that it would be foolish to continue racing in those conditions. lt was the state of the sea – rather than the strength of the wind – that forced skippers to make their decisions.
What Was the Reason for Damage to the Fleet?
There are many factors that could be taken into account here, and I am sure that many skippers have learnt a lot of lessons from this race.
The biggest cause of damage was, I am sure, due to the seas which were whipped up by the current.
The charts for the area do warn all mariners that ‘freak waves’ of up to 20 metres in height, preceded by a deep trough, may be encountered in the area between the edge of the Continental shelf and 20 miles seaward thereof. These can occur when a strong south-westerly is blowing against the fast south flowing Agulhas Current; the sea is rough, and the barometric pressure is low.
Many yachts went to seaward to make the most of the Agulhas Current, and were therefore in the area where freak (or rogue waves, as I prefer to call them) are found. This was not necessarily a bad thing, because some of the yachts started heading inshore late in the afternoon, while others came in once the storm started, getting out of the danger area, and then running for home.
Having made a decision to head for home, some yachts still in the current set a reciprocal course for Durban, and then went diagonally across the current and seas to make port. By doing this, they were in the danger zone far longer than any other yacht that headed for the shore first, and then for home.
I am not advocating that it was wrong to set a course for home immediately the decision was made to return, but purely wish to point out the fact that by doing this, yachts had a greater chance of being caught by a rogue wave as they were in the danger zone longer.
The waves were high and extremely steep, and were often described as ‘express trains’ because of their speed and the noise they generated.
There is an interesting formula known as Stevenson’s Formula which one can use to determine the height of a wave.
Wave Height = (the square root of) 1,5 X Fetch (in nautical miles).
The Fetch is the uninterrupted stretch of water over which the wind can operate. Assuming that the wind originated deep in the South Atlantic, some two or three thousand miles away, the wave height could have been between 54 and 67 feet.
lt is always difficult to determine the height of waves from a yacht, and this is why there were so many vastly different heights reported.
All the yachts that lost masts were knocked down – some more severely than others – and most occurred while they were running with the seas. There were yachts that did 360 degree rolls, and others that had knockdowns between 90 and 180 degrees. Fortunately, all crew members were harnessed on, and those that were thrown overboard, were all able to get back aboard safely.
lt was mandatory that every safety harness should have a crutch strap, and every safety harness was inspected prior to the start. (This ruling was made as a result of the 1979 Fastnet Race Inquiry.)
Was there anything to be learnt?
A unanimous ‘yes’ from virtually everyone I have spoken to.
For many, this was their first taste of running under bare poles, or even lying a-hull.
Many of the knockdowns occurred a few hours after the main brunt of the storm had been borne. This could have been because the wind strength had moderated considerably, yet the seas had not. This could have led to a false sense of security, and helmsmen not being as alert as they should have been. Exhaustion could also be a contributing factor to the knockdowns.
Harnesses appeared to cause no problems, as every one washed overboard was retrieved. One point that did arise was that some of the self-tightening harness types could over tighten with disastrous results. Also, under load, there is only one way that a harness can be undone, and that is with a knife!
How many crew carried their own personal knives is probably an embarrassing question? Often, there is no time to get the knife that is ‘just inside the hatch’.
John Gordon-Thomson of L26 fame, and a yachtsman with many thousands of sea miles under his belt, insists on crew carrying their own knives. I learnt this sailing with John, who never goes to sea without one.
While on the subject of safety harnesses, I believe that it is important for every crew to have his own safety harness. Not only is it permanently adjusted, but he gets to know how to wear it correctly, and in a hurry. It also gives him just that little extra sense of security.
Navigation did not appear to be a real problem, but once the storm hit and everyone had settled down, the navigator often did not know exactly where he was. In the conditions experienced, navigation can tend to be considered a second priority. Often, navigators do not get the crew or helmsmen to fill in the log every hour, and without all this information in the log, the navigator can have a difficult time working out exactly where he is.
Keep an up to date log at all times!
Again, in the prevailing conditions, proper lookouts were not maintained, as the safest position for the crew was as low in the boat as possible, or down below. If the crew are going to sit in the cockpit, they should be instructed to have a good look out every 10 minutes or so.
Life rafts fortunately did not come under the spotlight, but what was made abundantly clear was that they needed to be securely tied down, yet still remain easily accessible.
There were reports of life rafts breaking loose during knockdowns, and in one instance, the raft actually began inflating. In another reported instance, the rip cord to inflate the raft had not been attached to the yacht!
These may appear to be minor issues, yet they are major enough to make the difference between life and death.
At the de-briefing, a week after the event, a number of skippers felt that storm sails should be made out of orange coloured sailcloth to make the yachts more visible.
One suggestion from a skipper who was dismasted, was that storm jibs should have cringles along the luff to act as cunninghams. His mast broke at the spreaders and he was able to set his storm jib on the topping lift, but could not get enough tension on the luff. Admittedly, he had hanks, whereas yachts with twin luff grooves do have eyelets along the luff of the storm jib.
Stanchion anchor points need to be carefully checked, as in many cases, the bases pulled through the deck as bodies were washed with great force into the guardrails.
In many instances, having made the decision to turn for home, yachts were going too fast, even under bare poles, for it to be safe. Many yachts streamed warps, and in two cases, skippers also decided to stream the anchor and all its chain, together with the warp. In all cases, this definitely slowed the yachts, but in some, it increased the number of times they were pooped.
In summing up, many lessons were learnt, yet the standard of seamanship displayed by all yachtsmen during the race was of the highest order indeed, and of a standard that everyone can be proud of.
A Passionate Plea
Over the years I have been given a lot of material about the 1984 race, and in fact many other Vasco races, to have accumulated a burgeoning archive of material from newspaper cuttings, original photos, reports, magazine features and even personal accounts.
I cherish each and every one of these, and have sufficient to write a book about the 50-plus years of the Vasco da Gama Race – something I will ultimately do.
I already have in excess of 15 000 individual Vasco Race files.
But as always, there are gaps that need filling in terms of full results, photos, reports, personal accounts, scrap books, newspaper cuttings and basically “anything Vasco” that individuals, Clubs and organising authorities have on the race.
So I am making a plea to anyone, and everyone, who has any material on this tough ocean race to consider lending me their personal records of the race for digitising. My promise is that they will be returned in good order – and with digitised files of their material too.
From the files I have so far, I have been able to compile a results database, starting with the earliest races when the race was from Maputo to Durban.
I have a complete database of all the trophy winners in the Vasco da Gama Race.
Every single written word, every single photo, and every single memory of the Vasco race is important to me.
Should you have any material you would lend me, please contact me via email at: editor@sailing.co.za
